We study how work-based health insurance system in the United States effects the lives of the personal chooses of healthcare. We believe that health insurance system is a form of human capital that affects the productivity of workers in the labor market, and therefore require the impact of employee turnover on the incentives for investment in health.
Our health insurance system model shows that health insurance system leads in turnover for the ineffective powerful investment in healthcare, and more importantly, this suggests that employment-based health insurance system could be one of the first in the United States at a low level of ineffective health people of working age. Also shows that positive under investment in health related to the rate of turnover of employees in industry and increased medical costs in retirement. We provide empirical evidence for the health insurance system model's two discs, medical expenditure Panel Survey (PE) and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). In Parliament, we find that employers in industries with high rates of turnover far less for health insurance systeme for their employees.
When employers offer health insurance system contracts have a higher discount and employer contributions for health insurance system premiums are higher in high turnover industries. In addition, employees who are committed to a high turnover and reduce medical costs and less caution. In the HRS, but we believe that people employed in industries where high turnover increase of medical costs in retirement. The size of our estimates show a high degree of failure over time investments in health in the United States following the employment-based health insurance system. We also assess the doubt on alternative explanations for health insurance system.